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Abstract We investigate the effect of decimalization on the aftermarket trading of
NYSE-listed IPOs. We find that the relation between bid–ask spread and underpricing
becomes negative post-decimalization, suggesting that benefits from the increased price
competition accrue more to hot IPOs. The quoted depth is generally smaller post-deci-
malization due to a higher probability of front running, which aggravates the cost of
adverse selection and limit order submission. We show that underwriters continue to
provide price support but are only willing to cover the initial short position, if profitable to
do so. Decimal pricing does not affect the flipping strategy of institutions for cold IPOs as
they are likely bound by the underwriter’s price support and their share allocation. Insti-
tutions, however, tend to flip more hot IPOs during the post- than in the pre-decimalization
period, suggesting that the cost of flipping is lower for shares with a substantial price run-
up during aftermarket trading.
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1 Introduction
Ever since decimal pricing was fully implemented by US stock markets in 2001,1
numerous studies have analyzed its impact on several aspects of market quality. For
example, Chakravarty et al. (2001a, b) show that decimal pricing resulted in narrower
quoted and effective spreads, and thinner quoted depths at the best bid and ask prices on
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Similarly, Bacidore et al. (2001), and NYSE
(2001a, b) show that NYSE stocks exhibit smaller spreads and depths after decimalization.
In the same way, Chakravarty et al. (2004) find that both the number of trades and trading
volume declined significantly on the NYSE after decimalization.
While earlier studies add to our understanding of the effect of decimalization, they focus
mainly on well-established seasoned stocks. An initial public offering (IPO) is an
important activity in capital markets as it is the only way for a company to be listed
publicly and access the capital market. The number of IPOs each year is often used as an
indication of the health of an economy and the IPO underwriting business is an important
source of revenue for investment banks and financial institutions. Uncertainty and infor-
mation asymmetry are especially high for newly listed firms as they do not have a prior
trading history. However, no study has yet explored in detail how decimalization may
affect the aftermarket liquidity and trading activity of newly listed stocks. Institutional and
retail investors are increasingly interested in the aftermarket trading of IPOs,2 especially in
the benefits of decimalization as the information content of IPOs may have shifted post-
decimalization.
Secondary market liquidity, especially on the first day of trading, is crucial for a
successful IPO. A liquid market not only helps reduce the market stabilization costs of
underwriters and the market making costs of market makers, it also ensures that issuing
firms continue to have access to the capital market at a lower cost of capital.3 Ellis et al.
(2000, 2002) find that the lead underwriter is the only active liquidity provider for
NASDAQ IPOs, especially when a newly listed security has been traded below the offering
price. Using a proprietary database, Corwin et al. (2004) provide evidence that limit orders
are an important and informative source of liquidity for IPOs listed on the NYSE. They
show that the underwriter always provides stabilization for IPOs with greater selling
pressures by submitting orders on the trading floor. Boehmer and Fishe (2004b) find that
the lead underwriter provides substantial liquidity to the market when share price falls
below the offering price, price volatility increases, or when market liquidity decreases.
In this study, we provide a detailed investigation of the impact of decimalization on the
trading of IPO shares on the secondary market.4 Figure 1a shows that the average volume
per trade and the average number of trades of the NYSE-listed IPOs are rather high on the
1 NYSE and AMEX implemented decimal pricing initially with a small number of stocks on August 28,
September 25, and December 4, 2000, and finally with the remaining stocks on January 29, 2001. NASDAQ,
however, experimented with decimal pricing in March 2001 and went to full implementation in April 9,
2001.
2 We refer aftermarket trading as the first-day trading of post-IPO throughout this study. All NYSE-listed
IPOs in our sample switched to decimal pricing in 2001.
3 Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) provide a detailed discussion on
the relation between liquidity and stock returns. Butler et al. (2005) find that investment banks charge lower
fees to seasoned equity offering firms with more liquid stocks.
4 The start of IPOs aftermarket trading is unique, important, and is a period of extremely high trading
activity [e.g., Corwin et al. (2004), Ellis et al. (2000, 2002), and Ellis (2006)]. Price stabilization and flipping
are important activities, especially during the IPOs’ first day of trading.
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first IPO trading day, and stabilizes rapidly after the second day in both the pre- and post-
decimalization periods. In Fig. 1b, we observe that the average depth per quote and the
number of quotes are relatively higher on the first day. This unique IPO trading charac-
teristic contributes toward the understanding of the relation between decimalization and
liquidity, underwriter support, and flipping activity.5 Our findings have important
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Fig. 1 This figure plots the average volume per trade (a) and the average depth per quote (b) of the 230
NYSE-listed IPOs for 25-day in pre- and post-decimalization periods. The VPT_Pre (Qdepth_Pre) and
VPT_Post (Qdepth_Post) are average volume per trade (quoted depth per quote), respectively, in pre- and
post-decimalizations periods. NT_Pre (NQ_Pre) and NT_Post (NQ_Post) are the average number of total
trades (quotes) in pre- and post-decimalization periods, respectively. IPOs issued after January 29, 2001 are
classified in post-decimalization period
5 Flipping refers to the activity of selling shares immediately after an IPO begins trading in the aftermarket.
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implications for decimalization on aftermarket trading of IPOs and provide a more com-
plete picture of decimalization on newly listed securities.
We examine only NYSE-listed IPOs for the following reasons. First, the IPO listing
requirements and market microstructure of the NYSE and NASDAQ are different.6 Sec-
ond, NASDAQ has higher industry clustering of technology firms7 and experienced the
bursting of the internet bubble during our sample period.8 The use of NASDAQ stocks may
therefore contaminate the analysis. Third, Chung et al. (2003) note that the trade and quote
(TAQ) database reports only the largest, not the aggregate, depth at the inside market for
NASDAQ issues, but the aggregate depth, specialist depth plus all limit orders at the
quoted price, for NYSE issues. Hence, it would not be possible to study the depth of
NASDAQ stocks with TAQ data.
Using the TAQ data from the NYSE, we analyze spreads and depths for a sample of
NYSE-listed IPOs before and after decimalization for hot, warm, and cold IPOs. We find
that IPO spreads on the listing day are generally smaller in the post-decimalization period,
but the reduction is larger and significant for hot and warm IPOs. These results suggest that
price competition of hot and warm IPOs has increased in the post-decimalization period.
Consistent with previous research on seasoned stocks, the depths of IPOs narrowed after
decimalization. Both bid and ask depths decreased significantly for hot and cold IPOs. The
adverse selection cost of submitting limit orders and the cost between market and limit
orders after decimalization explain this smaller display of liquidity for IPOs. The high
frequency of trade, volume, and limit buy order executions at and below the offering price
suggests that the underwriter continues to support cold IPOs at the offering price, and
covers the initial short position below offering price with market purchases when it is still
profitable to do so in the post-decimalization period.
Institutions generally flip more cold IPOs than hot IPOs in both the pre- and post-
decimalization periods. Our results show that decimal pricing does not change the flipping
strategy of institutions for cold IPOs, as flipping is bound by underwriter price stabilization
and regular share allocation to institutions. Institutions, however, flip more hot IPOs post-
decimalization than in the pre-decimalization period, indicating that the cost of flipping is
much lower for those stocks whose share prices increase substantially and rapidly during
aftermarket trading.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature
review on decimalization and aftermarket trading of IPOs. Section 3 describes the sample
data and research methodology. Section 4 presents our empirical results on the effect of
decimalization on market liquidity and aftermarket trading of IPOs. Section 5 summarizes
and concludes.
6 Corwin and Harris (2001) find that smaller and riskier firms tend to list on NASDAQ to avoid the higher
listing fees on the NYSE. The aggregating demand feature of the NYSE suggests that their IPOs have lower
underpricing and narrower spreads than IPOs that trade on NASDAQ [see Bennouri et al. (2012)].
Importantly, the underwriter typically becomes the market maker of NASDAQ-listed IPOs, but NYSE Rule
98 requires an organizational separation between the underwriter and the specialist.
7 Using the Standard and Poors Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) code at the ten-industry
sector level, about 28 % of the firms are classified in the information technology industry on the NASDAQ,
whereas only 7 % of the firms are in this industry on the NYSE.
8 Ritter and Welch (2002) document that the percentage of technology IPOs dropped from 72 % (803 IPOs)
during the internet bubble in 1999–2000 to 29 % (80 IPOs) in 2001.
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2 Literature review
2.1 Decimalization and liquidity
A series of changes were made to the minimum price variation on the NYSE starting on
June 24, 1997, when the tick size was reduced from $1/8 to $1/16.9 With the aim of
aligning the NYSE with international practice, decreasing transaction costs, and making
prices more easily understood by all investors, the NYSE initiated a decimalization pro-
gram to further reduce the tick size to one cent. Inevitably, prices are now quoted in
decimals instead of fractions. The conversion was carried out over four stages, with the
first stage occurring on August 28, 2000 and the last stage being completed on January 29,
2001. Henceforth, numerous studies have investigated the effects of tick size reductions on
the spreads and depths of NYSE stocks [see, for example, Bollen and Whaley (1998),
Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000), Van Ness et al. (2000), Chung and Chuwonganant (2002),
Bacidore et al. (2003), and Chakravarty et al. (2004)].
Bollen and Whaley (1998), Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000), and Van Ness et al. (2000),
and Jones and Lipson (2001) investigate the effects of the tick size reduction from $1/8 to
$1/16 on common stocks. They find that the overall spread and depth decreased after the
tick size change. Chung and Chuwonganant (2002) analyze the effects of the tick size
change on quote revisions. They discover that the number of quote revisions that involve
the changing of the spread increased significantly after the tick size change. Furthermore,
they find that the number of quote revisions initiated by changes in the spread is smaller for
stocks with lower prices and/or larger volumes. They interpret the result as evidence that
the $1/16 tick size is still a binding constraint on absolute spreads. The authors provide
evidence that decimalization further reduces price rigidity and increases price competition
by showing a significant increase in the frequency of spread and quote revisions after
decimalization.
Chakravarty et al. (2001a, b) analyze the effects of decimalization on NYSE stocks and
find that decimal pricing leads to lower quoted and effective spreads. They show that the
depth at the best bid and ask prices are much smaller after decimalization. Empirical
studies by the NYSE (2001a, b) document several changes that occurred after the NYSE
converted to decimal pricing. First, transaction costs fell. Effective spreads, on average,
fell by 43 %, the average bid–ask spread fell by more than half compared to its pre-
decimalization size, and net price improvement rose 29 %. Second, the number of trades
increased by 76 %, and the number of limit orders doubled. However, transaction size per
trade fell. The average limit order size fell by 21 % and 42.4 % of limit orders were
cancelled compared to 34.2 % during the pre-decimalization period. Thirdly, decimal-
ization had adversely affected the transparency of the market. The quoted amount of
interest fell by an average of two-thirds. Lastly, the NYSE reported that more than 80 % of
trades occurred at spreads larger than one cent, showing that sub-decimal pricing would not
bring about much gain to the market. Although the displayed liquidity is lower and can-
cellation is higher following decimalization, Bacidore et al. (2003) find that the lower
displayed liquidity does not result in poorer execution quality as traders do not reduce the
9 We conduct an analysis on the impact of tick size reduction from $1/8 to $1/16 on the spreads of NYSE-
listed IPOs from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 1998. Our results (not reported but available upon
request) show that the spreads decline significantly for hot, warm, and cold IPOs after the reduction.
However, we do not find any evidence that suggests a relation between spreads and underpricing for tick size
changes on June 24, 1997. We thank the referee for suggesting the test for the tick size reduction for NYSE-
listed IPOs on June 24, 1997.
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use of limit orders in favor of market orders. Using a matched sample of ‘‘decimal’’ and
‘‘non-decimal’’ stocks on the NYSE, Chakravarty et al. (2004) find that the quoted depth,
quoted and effective spreads, number of trades, and trading volume declined significantly
after decimalization, and conclude that the effect of decimalization on market liquidity is
mixed. Chou et al. (2005) find that the abnormal ex-split day returns decrease and the
abnormal trading volume increases in decimal pricing era due to a lower transaction cost.
Chung et al. (2004) document that the reduction in spread and depth caused by deci-
malization is, firstly, due to the removal of the binding constraint imposed by the tick size.
After decimalization, the constraint on spread imposed by the tick size is reduced to one
cent. Secondly, the increase in the probability of front running (i.e., the usage of insider
information to act in advance of upcoming transactions) also contributes to the decrease in
spread and depth. As decimalization has effectively reduced the cost of stepping in front of
existing orders to one penny, professional traders are more likely to engage in front
running, resulting in narrower spreads. Due to a higher probability of front running, traders
are reluctant to display their interest. As a result, quoted depth is reduced. The authors also
report that decimalization led to changes in five stock attributes, i.e., share price, number of
trades, trade size, return volatility, and market capitalization, which in turn affected the
spread and depth. In addition, they observe that sub-penny pricing may further reduce the
spreads of high volume, low risk, or low price stocks. However, the effects of decimal-
ization may vary across hot and cold IPOs due to the following reasons:
1. Price competition of hot IPOs increases as the costs of front running are much lower
after decimalization. However, price competition is limited in the case of cold IPOs
because (1) the underwriter is the major liquidity provider and provides certain price
support at the IPO offering price for cold IPOs to maintain their reputation, (2)
investors, who were allocated the initial shares, may want to quote a smaller ask price
to get rid of the cold issue immediately, but may be indifferent to quoting only one
cent above the bid price or to submit a market order at the bid price after
decimalization. Thus, the spreads of cold IPOs are not expected to decline much after
decimalization if investors submit limit sell orders.
2. Aggarwal and Conroy (2000) document that the price discovery process of IPOs is
almost completed just before secondary market trading begins. Therefore, the large
sell information content in cold IPOs is richer than in hot IPOs (Schultz and Zaman
(1994) and Krishnan et al. (2006)), and the information asymmetry of cold IPOs is also
lower than in hot IPOs. It is obvious that quoted spreads are lower for the cold IPOs
compared to hot IPOs. Since the large sell information and the information asymmetry
component of cold IPOs are still the same after decimalization, we do not expect
spreads of cold IPOs to decrease significantly post-decimalization.
Therefore, we hypothesize that decimalization is associated with a greater reduction of
spreads for IPOs with a larger underpricing (hot IPOs) than in less underpriced IPOs (cold
IPOs).
SHotpost  SHotpre\SColdpost  SColdpre
In summary, previous studies only provide evidence of the effect of decimalization on
the market liquidity of seasoned stocks. Since the degrees of underwriter price support and
flipping activity for IPOs are dependent on the extent of underpricing, decimalization may
have different levels of impact on market liquidity in the aftermarket. However, how
decimal pricing might affect the aftermarket liquidity of an IPO is not clear without further
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examining the price stabilization of underwriter and flipping activity in aftermarket
trading.
2.2 Decimalization and underwriter price support
Research on aftermarket trading in IPOs of underwriters and other market participants has
grown in recent years. One important aftermarket activity is whether an underwriter offers
price stabilization to an IPO in the aftermarket. Benveniste et al. (1996) argue that price
support is a bonding mechanism to alleviate the worry of investors from a decline in the
price of their IPOs shares. Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) show that stabilization by an
underwriter helps to relieve the winner’s curse for uninformed investors. Lewellen (2006)
argues that price support also helps to maintain the underwriter’s reputation with the
investor. Ruud (1993) shows that the distribution of initial returns is nearly censored at
zero, which suggests that the underwriter stabilizes IPOs at the offering price. Hanley et al.
(1993) find evidence that the lead underwriter engages in stabilization and temporarily
inflates the stock price for overpriced offerings. Schultz and Zaman (1994) find that
underwriters generally quote the highest bids and actively support the price of less suc-
cessful IPOs, and argue that this price support has a permanent impact on increasing the
aftermarket price.
Ellis et al. (2000, 2002) use a unique database to examine the aftermarket trading of lead
and co-lead underwriters on NASDAQ-listed IPOs, where the lead underwriter is the
market maker. They find that the lead underwriter accumulates a large inventory in
aftermarket trading and engages in stabilization activity for less successful IPOs. Aggarwal
(2000) documents that underwriters purchase 16 % of the offering in the aftermarket to
cover their short position as a form of price support. Boehmer and Fishe (2004a, b) find
that the underwriter actively repurchases shares in offerings that trade below the offering
price to provide stabilization. Corwin et al. (2004) use proprietary data from a NYSE
System Order to show that NYSE-listed IPOs have an unusually high limit order book
depth on the first day of trading, and fall to a stable level within 2–3 weeks. Bid–ask
spreads of limit order books are unusually low at the start of trading. Furthermore, hot IPOs
have a significant buy imbalance during the first half hour of trading, whereas cold IPOs
have a significant sell imbalance throughout the first day of trading. The authors find that
the underwriter provides price stabilization to cold IPOs through the trading floor, con-
tributing 74 % of the quoted bid depth on the first trading day.
Price support for IPOs is not only important and necessary, but also profitable in
aftermarket trading. To provide aftermarket stabilization for an IPO, the underwriter
typically oversells the issue to hold a short position when trading starts [see, for example,
Ritter (1998), Aggarwal (2000), Ellis et al. (2000, 2002), Fishe (2002), and Boehmer and
Fishe (2004b)]. If the share price declines below the offering price, the underwriter buy in
the market to cover their short position and earn a profit from covering below the offering
price. However, if the share price goes up substantially in the aftermarket, underwriters
may exercise their over-allotment option10 to cover their short position and earn the gross
spreadshares. Therefore, both short-covering and over-allotment offer a great incentive for
the underwriter to provide price support in the aftermarket trading to eliminate the cost of
10 Overallotment options are also known as Green Shoe options. Normally, the issuer allows the underwriter
to offer shares up to 115 % with an over-allotment options agreement which allows the underwriter to buy
additional shares from the issuer within 30-days. In our sample, 226 out of 230 NYSE-listed IPOs have the
overallotment options agreement with underwriters.
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stabilization to the underwriter. In the present study, we explore how decimal pricing may
affect the trading strategy of the underwriter.
Boehmer and Fishe (2004b), in addition, argue that the short-covering is more valuable
than overallotment options for an underwriter in cold issues. Krishnan et al. (2006) doc-
ument that there is no hard floor at the offering price in the secondary market support for
cold IPOs. In the post-decimalization period, since the minimum tick size is only one cent,
the cost of short-covering may increase if the share price does not drop substantially below
the offering price. It is possible that an underwriter may provide price support by short-
covering only when it is still profitable (many ticks below the offering price), although the
tick size is only one cent. Since investors want to get rid of their cold IPOs, underwriters
are able to profit from a market purchase if the share price drops below the offering price.11
Therefore, the underwriter’s price stabilization by short-covering cold IPOs should be
similar during both the pre- and post-decimalization periods. We thus hypothesize that
there is no difference in the underwriter’s price stabilization mechanism of short-covering
cold IPOs between the pre- and post-decimalization periods.
2.3 Decimalization and flipping activity
Flipping of IPO shares is active in aftermarket trading and is related to the degree of
underpricing. Krigman et al. (1999) use seller-initiated block trades (10,000 shares or
more) to proxy for the extent of flipping, and find that institutions (1) flip IPOs more than
individuals do and (2) flip more cold IPOs. Flipping by institutions accounts for 45 % of
total dollar volume on the first day for cold IPOs and 22 % for hot IPOs. Aggarwal (2003),
using a unique proprietary data set, finds that institutions are allocated more than 73 % of
IPO shares, and conclude that institutions flip more often than retail investors, especially in
hot IPOs. Aggarwal also documents that flipping accounts for 23 % of trading volume for
cold IPOs and 17.5 % for hot IPOs. Fishe (2002) presents a model to show that stock
flippers have the greatest effect on the pricing of weak IPOs and provide an explanation for
underwriter price support. This leads us to the question of how decimal pricing might
affect flipping activity in the IPO aftermarket.
Since the tick size in the post-decimalization period is only one cent, given the price
uncertainty and asymmetric information at the start of aftermarket trading, the cost of
adverse selection faced by limit order traders is even higher in the post-decimalization
period, as the probability of front running has become higher. This implies that the cost of
submitting market orders is lower than that of submitting limit orders. Further, because
institutions tend to consume liquidity rather than to provide liquidity, the cost of flipping is
relatively lower for stock flippers in the post-decimalization period. On the other hand, due
to the lower displayed liquidity post-decimalization, stock flippers may also face a higher
cost of flipping, as they may have to consume more depth at different quotes.
Previous studies have documented that the degree of flipping varies across IPOs. The
stock flipper may not employ the same trading strategy12 as a result of the tick size
reduction on different IPO issues, i.e., hot, warm, cold IPOs. In the pre- and post-
11 Chen and Ritter (2000) document a seven percent rule of the underwriter spread. Thus, it is obvious that
short-covering from a market purchase is profitable if the share price drops more than seven percent below
the offering price, regardless of pre- or post-decimalization.
12 Krigman et al. (1999) and Aggarwal (2003) document that institutional investors flip more than retail
investors in the aftermarket. Also, institutional investors tend to consume liquidity rather than provide
liquidity.
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decimalization period, the underwriter is the only liquidity provider for cold IPOs and still
allocates, preferably to institutions, a large proportion of IPO shares (more than 73 %).
Although institutions find it less costly to flip after decimalization, flipping of cold IPOs is
restricted by underwriter price support and their shares allocation. Therefore, if flippers had
tended to flip cold IPOs pre-decimalization, it is not tenable that decimal pricing would
alter their flipping strategy. However, if share prices increase substantially and rapidly
post-IPO, i.e., hot issues, stock flippers may find it less costly to do so at a higher price
post-decimalization as they can now front running their orders by just one cent. For high
demand issues, the lower cost of flipping may provide just the right incentive to institu-
tional flippers in the post-decimalization period. We thus hypothesize that decimalization
induces higher instances of institutional flipping of hot IPOs than cold IPOs.
3 Data and research methodology
3.1 The IPO sample
The IPO data are obtained from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New Issue database
for 1998–2004. We exclude unit offerings, closed-end funds, ADRs, and REITs. The data
selection criteria yield a sample size of 230 NYSE-listed IPOs. Basic information on the
offering date, offering price, number of shares issued, net proceeds, underwriter compen-
sation, number of lead and co-lead managers, underwriter market shares, and over-allotment
shares are obtained.We also extract financial information, such as total assets, net sales, total
debt, total liabilities, earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT), returns on assets (ROA), and
returns on operating cash flows (Cash ROA), fromCompustat. All financial data are based on
the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO. If any data is missing in Compustat, we
supplement it with the relevant IPO prospectus filed with the SEC. Market value, defined as
the first trading day’s closing price times the post-IPO number of shares outstanding, is
obtained from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database. For each IPO,
we retrieve the relevant transaction data from the NYSE’s TAQ database. The transaction
data provide the time, price, and volume for each trade and quote. As Blume and Goldstein
(1997) show, quotes that originate from off the NYSE are only occasionally better than the
NYSE quotes. Hence, only NYSE quotes are used in the present study.
In the TAQ database, we omit the following to minimize data errors: (1) quotes, if either
the ask price or bid price is less than or equal to zero; (2) quotes, if either the ask size or the
bid size is less than or equal to zero; (3) quotes, if the bid price is greater than or equal to
the ask price; (4) quotes, if the bid–ask spread is greater than $5; (5) before-the-open and
after-the-close trades and quotes; (6) trades, if the price or volume is less than or equal to
zero; (7) out-of-sequence trades and quotes.
Table 1 presents the distribution of the 230 NYSE-listed IPOs. Using January 29, 2001,
the full scale implementation of decimal pricing, as the cutoff date, 114 and 116 IPOs are
grouped into before and after decimalization samples, respectively. Each sub-group of
IPOs is further divided into three sub-samples categorized by their initial returns defined as
offer-to-open returns. To control for market conditions, we compute the market-adjusted
offer-to-open return using the market return prior to the IPO listing day. We find that the
Pearson and Spearman’s correlations between the offer-to-open return and market-adjusted
offer-to-open return are higher than 99 % in both the pre- and post-decimalization periods.
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Corwin et al. (2004) find that there is no relation between hot IPOs and market liquidity.
We plot the distribution of offer-to-open returns for all NYSE-listed IPOs in the pre- and
post-decimalization periods. We then select the median offer-to-open returns of 10 % as
the cutoff for hot and warm IPOs. Previous studies use ad hoc cutoff points to classify hot,
warm, and cold IPOs. Schultz and Zaman (1994) and Ellis et al. (2000, 2002) classify IPOs
that traded above the offering price as hot IPOs, and IPOs that traded at and below their
offering price as cold IPOs. Corwin et al. (2004) classify hot IPOs as those that open more
than 15 % above the offering price, and cold IPOs as those that open at or below the
offering price. Aggarwal and Conroy (2000) split their sample, based on offer-to-open
returns, into weak IPOs with offer-to-open return less than or equal to 10 %, and hot IPOs
with offer-to-open return greater than 20 %. In the present study, we define hot IPOs as
those that open above the offering price by more than 10 %, warm IPOs above the offering
price by no more than 10 %, and cold IPOs at or below offering price.13 This yields 52 hot,
33 warm, and 29 cold IPOs issued before decimalization and 48 hot, 40 warm, and 28 cold
IPOs issued after decimalization.14 This sub-grouping is necessary since the degree of
market stabilization by underwriters and flipping activity are likely to vary across IPOs.
The degree of similarity of IPOs in the pre- and post-decimalization periods is important
to our study. Table 1 shows that the industry distribution15 of IPOs is comparable in the
Table 1 Sample distribution
Code Industry name Pre-decimalization
(1/1/1998–1/28/2001)
Post-decimalization
(1/29/2001–12/31/2004)
All Hot Warm Cold All Hot Warm Cold
10 Energy 7 2 4 1 14 3 10 1
15 Materials 5 0 0 5 6 2 2 2
20 Industrials 18 9 5 4 14 4 4 6
25 Consumer Discretionary 25 13 5 7 25 13 6 6
30 Consumer Staples 7 2 2 3 4 0 2 2
35 Health Care 9 7 1 1 11 7 1 3
40 Financials 24 10 8 6 27 12 9 6
45 Information Technology 11 5 5 1 11 5 4 2
50 Telecommunication Services 3 2 1 0 1 0 1 0
55 Utilities 5 2 2 1 3 2 1 0
All 114 52 33 29 116 48 40 28
This table presents the sample distributions of 230 NYSE-listed IPOs by IPO-type, industry, and deci-
malization. We partition the sample during 1998–2004 into pre- and post-decimalization based on the full
implementation of decimalization program on NYSE on January 29, 2001. We classify the IPOs as Hot,
Warm, and Cold based on the offer-to-open returns. Hot IPOs are those that open above the offering price by
more than 10 %, warm IPOs open above the offering price by no more than 10 %, and cold IPOs open at or
below offering price. All IPOs are assigned the Standard and Poors Global Industry Classification Standard
(GICS) code at the ten-industry sector level
13 We also use other classifications for hot, warm, and cold IPOs employed by previous studies for our
robustness checks. Overall, the results do not change materially.
14 Consistent with the argument of underwriter price stabilization in cold IPOs, 25 out of the 29 and 22 out
of the 28 cold IPOs open at exactly the offering price in the pre- and post-decimalization periods,
respectively.
15 IPOs are assigned the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) code at the ten-industry sector
level.
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pre- and post- periods. The offer and firm characteristics of IPOs are presented in Table 2.
Generally, there is no significant difference between the pre- and post-decimalization
samples in terms of the issue and firm characteristics. In Panel A of Table 2, the means of
shares offered, net proceeds, offering price, over-allotment shares, gross spread, and
underwriter market shares are not significantly different before and after decimalization.
The means (medians) of the offering price are, respectively, $18.73 ($17.00) and $19.16
($18.00) in the pre- and post-decimalization periods. Both the mean and median of the
gross spread before and after decimalization are between 7 and 8 %, which is consistent
with the findings of Chen and Ritter (2000). The mean and median open-to-close returns
are 0.52 % (1.00 %) and 0.00 % (0.34 %), respectively, pre-decimalization (post-deci-
malization). Both the mean and median of open-to-close returns are not statistically sig-
nificant in both the pre- and post-decimalization periods. This result is consistent with
Barry and Jennings (1992), Schultz and Zaman (1994), and Aggarwal and Conroy (2000)
who report that the opening price captures almost all the initial returns. The small open-to-
close returns, both pre- and post-decimalization, suggest that our classification for hot,
warm, and cold IPOs using offer-to-open returns is indifferent to offer-to-close returns. The
mean and median of over-allotment shares account for 10–14 % of the number of shares
offered in the pre- and post-decimalization periods, which is consistent with a Green Shoe
option agreement.
We present the firm characteristics in Panel B of Table 2. Market capitalization, total
assets, and net sales, which are used as proxies for firm size, are on average similar before
and after decimalization. Total debt, total liabilities, and debt-to-asset ratio are insignifi-
cantly different between pre- and post-decimalization. Profitability measures such as EBIT,
ROA, and Cash ROA, are also not significantly different before and after decimalization.
Collectively, these results suggest that our analysis would not be affected by the IPO issue
and firm characteristics between the pre- and post-decimalization periods.
3.2 Spreads and depths
We employ four traditional spread measures of market liquidity: (1) Quoted spread in dollars
[(Ai,t - Bi,t)]; (2) Quoted spread as a proportion of the quotemidpoint [(Ai,t - Bi,t)/Mi,t]; (3)
Effective spread in dollars [2Di,t(Pi,t - Mi,t)]; and (4) Effective spread as a proportion of
the quote midpoint [2Di,t(Pi,t - Mi,t)/Mi,t], where, Ai,t is the quoted ask price for stock i at
time t, Bi,t is the quoted bid price for stock i at time t, Mi,t is the midpoint of Ai,t and Bi,t, Pi,t is
the transaction price for stock i at time t, and Di,t is trade direction which is equal to ?1 for
buyer-initiated trades and-1 for seller-initiated trades. Lee and Ready’s (1991) algorithm16
is used to classify trades as buys or sells. Following Bessembinder (2003), we make no
allowance for trade reporting lags to assess whether trades are buyer or seller initiated.
As Lee et al. (1993) note, any study of liquidity provision must examine changes in both
prices and depth. Prior studies found that the quoted depth of NYSE stocks declined
significantly after a change in the tick size [e.g., Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000), Bacidore
et al. (2001), Chakravarty et al. (2001a, b), and Chakravarty et al. (2004)]. However,
changes in the tick size may not equally affect the bid and ask depths of hot, warm, and
cold IPOs due to the different degrees of front running and underwriter support. We
16 Assigning trades completed at prices above (below) the prevailing quote midpoint as customer buys
(sells). Trades executed at the quote midpoint are assigned by the ‘‘tick test’’, in which trades at a higher
(lower) price as compared to the most recent trade at a different price are classified as buys (sells).
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therefore decompose the depth into bid and ask depths in terms of share and dollar depths
for hot, warm, and cold IPOs.
For each IPO, we first compute the time-weighted quoted spread, the trade-weighted
effective spread, and time-weighted quoted depths in the pre- and post-decimalization
periods on the first day of IPO trading. Depth is separately defined as bid depth, ask depth,
total depth (bid depth plus ask depth), and depth imbalance (the difference between the bid
and ask depth as a percentage of total depth). We measure each definition of depth in terms
of the number of shares traded (bid size and ask size) and the dollar value traded (bid
price 9 bid size plus ask price 9 ask size). We then employ the t test and Wilcoxon
signed-rank test to cross-sectionally examine the pre- and post-decimalization differences
in mean and median values of these variables, respectively.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Spreads
We observe in Table 3 that both the quoted and effective spreads in dollars for hot IPOs are
generally higher than warm and cold IPOs.17 This finding is consistent with Hanley et al.
(1993) who document that spreads narrow when the market price is close to the offering
price and stabilization is most likely, and Krishnan et al. (2006) who argue that the
information content of large sells during the stabilization period is the lowest in the quoted
spread of cold IPOs. Schultz and Zaman (1994), Hegde and Miller (1989), and Miller and
Reilly (1987) also find that spreads are narrower for stocks that are likely to be supported.
Consistent with the findings for seasoned stocks in previous studies, the quoted and
effective spreads, measured in dollars and proportion, for all IPOs are significantly smaller
in the post-decimalization period. However, the means and medians of both quoted and
effective spreads are significantly smaller for both hot and warm IPOs at the 1 % level in
the post-decimalization period. However, only the means of effective spreads of cold IPOs
are not statistically significant. Both quoted and effective dollar spreads decline by an
average of 36–58 and 31–53 % for hot and warm IPOs, respectively. The dollar spread of
cold IPOs decreased by\51 %; the t test statistic is not significant for the mean difference
of effective spreads. The percentage spread of hot and warm IPOs also declined more than
cold IPOs. These results suggest an increase in price competition among hot IPOs due to
the lower cost of front running post-decimalization. A higher probability of front running
post-decimalization comes mainly from two sources: sell-side and buy-side front running.
Since the demand for hot IPOs is high, investors may feel it less costly to compete with
both the market and limit orders post-decimalization. On the other hand, stock flippers may
flip more hot IPOs at a lower trading cost as share prices of hot IPOs usually increase
substantially and quickly after the opening trade. Spreads of cold IPOs, do not narrow as
much as in hot IPOs as the underwriter may still provide a certain degree of price support
at the offering price [see Ruud (1993), and Hanley et al. (1993)] in the post-decimalization
17 The Wilcoxon signed ranks tests (not reported but available upon request) show that the medians of both
quoted dollar spread and effective dollar spread for hot IPOs are higher than cold IPOs, and statistically
significant at 1 % in pre-decimalization. However, the medians are not significantly different between hot
and cold IPOs in post-decimalization. This result supports our findings later that hot IPOs receive greater
spread reductions after decimalization.
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period, which bounds the bid price to the offering price. Therefore, spread reductions are
mainly attributed to front running by sell-side traders.
4.2 Depths
Share and dollar depths are smaller and significant for all IPOs in the post-decimalization
period (see Table 3). The smaller depths are more prominent for hot and cold IPOs, which
are about 1/3 of the depths in the pre-decimalization period. This low displayed liquidity is
consistent with the higher adverse selection cost faced by limit order traders, and the lower
cost of submitting market orders post-decimalization. Further, for all IPOs, the ask depth
declines by an average of 60 % and is statistically significant at the 1 % level. However,
the bid depth decreased by 43 %. The ask depth of hot and cold IPOs went down by 72 and
59 %, respectively; bid depths of cold IPOs are higher than hot IPOs both in pre- and post-
decimalization. This finding is consistent with prior evidence of underwriter price support
for cold IPOs. Generally, decimalization has a greater impact on ask depth than bid depth,
which is attributable to trader behavior in IPOs. In aftermarket trading, underwriters tend to
provide liquidity or price support for the IPOs (especially cold IPOs) and the demand for
hot IPOs is usually high. Therefore, the reduction in the bid depth is largely smaller than
the ask depth after decimalization. While depth imbalance has decreased over all IPO
categories, the decrease is not statistically significant. The number of quotes is higher and
significant for hot, warm, and cold IPOs.
In summary, the depth of IPOs, regardless of the extent of underpricing, has declined
due to decimal pricing as this event aggravates the high adverse selection cost and is
associated with a higher probability of front running at the initial stage of IPO trading.
Thus, investors may have a higher incentive to submit quotes with smaller quantities in the
post-decimalization period.
4.3 Trading activities
Findings of both univariate and multivariate regression analyses of the first day trading
activities in both the pre- and post-decimalization periods are presented in Panel A and B
of Table 4, respectively. The mean and median differences of the average trading volume
and value between the pre- and post-decimalization periods are not statistically significant
for all IPO categories. However, the average trading volume at the ask price for all IPOs
(last column of Panel A and Model 3 of Panel B in Table 4) is significantly higher post-
decimalization but there is no significant change to the average trading volume at the bid
price. The higher ask trading volume is not surprising as the cost of front running from the
buy side, and of submitting market orders, is lower post-decimalization. The average ask
trading volume for warm and cold IPOs also increase after decimalization. However, the
average bid trading volume is not significantly different between the pre- and post-deci-
malization periods for all IPO categories.
The proportion of trading volume at the bid (ask) price is a monotonically decreasing
(increasing) function of IPO underpricing in both the pre- and post-decimalization periods,
as shown in Panel A of Table 4. This suggests that the selling pressure is higher for cold
IPOs regardless of decimal pricing. The results of Model 2 in Panel B further affirm the
finding from the negative and statistically significant coefficient of Underpricing on the
proportion of trading volume at the bid price. Consistent with the argument that the cost of
flipping hot IPOs is lower after decimalization, the proportion of trading volume at the bid
price is significantly higher for hot IPOs post-decimalization. Panel A and B (Model 4 and
1322 C. Charoenwong et al.
123
5) of Table 4 also show that the number of trades at the ask and bid prices decreases
significantly for hot, warm, and cold IPOs in the post-decimalization period. Interestingly,
we observe that the number of trades inside the spread increases significantly after deci-
malization, suggesting that traders have no incentive to reveal their interests in the trades
given a smaller tick size post-decimalization. Our results show that investors tend to submit
quotes in smaller quantities post-decimalization, resulting in a larger number of quotes and
a lower display of liquidity.
The median number of trades on the first trading day of IPOs in the post-decimalization
period is statistically significantly higher than in the pre-decimalization period for hot,
warm, and cold IPOs (Panel A of Table 4). We compute the average return volatility based
on the intraday returns on the first trading day of each IPO. Both Panel A and Panel B
(Model 1) of Table 4 show that the mean and median return volatility is significantly lower
post-decimalization. This decline is significant at the 1 % level for hot, warm, and cold
IPOs as shown in Panel A, where the dummy variable, POST, is negative and statistically
significant at the 1 % level. Our findings indicate that decimal pricing leads to a significant
decline in volatility for all categories of IPOs.
4.4 Intraday depths and spreads
Figure 2a–f show the intraday patterns of the average bid depth, ask depth, relative quoted
spread, and relative effective spread for hot, warm, and cold IPOs on the first day of
aftermarket trading.18 As the trading activity of IPOs is usually high, especially at the start
of trading, the spreads and depths may vary over time, and may have different patterns in
the pre- and post-decimalization periods. We split each day into 30-min intervals from
09:30 to 16:00. We find that hot IPOs generally do not start trading immediately at 09:30,
22 out of 52 (32 out of 48) times compared to cold IPOs with 23 out of 24 (23 out of 26)
times in the pre- (post-)decimalization period (results not reported but available upon
request). This is consistent with the finding of Aggarwal (2000). Most of the hot IPOs in
our sample commence trading after 10:00 A.M.
Figure 2a, d present the intraday mean depths and spreads for hot IPOs. We observe that
the bid depth is higher at the market opening and closing, exhibiting a U-shaped pattern
during the day in the pre-decimalization period. The ask depth, however, increases in the
morning and afternoon but is lower during the mid-day. Both bid and ask depths do not
have a strong U-shaped pattern post-decimalization. Both the bid and ask depths are
considerably lower post-decimalization, and especially so in the ask depth. The relative
quoted and effective spreads are also, on average, 50 % lower throughout the day in the
post-decimalization period. However, in both periods, the relative quoted spread is higher
at the beginning and at the last hour of trading, while the relative effective spread is higher
initially and stable at a lower level over time.
In Fig. 2b, e, intraday mean depths and spreads for warm IPOs are plotted. Both the bid
and ask depths are higher at the start and close in the pre- and post-decimalization periods.
However, bid and ask depths do not decrease immediately in the first hour trading post-
decimalization, while the initial depth is actually higher than in the pre-decimalization
period. The relative quoted and effective spreads are smaller throughout the day. Spreads
are higher at the first hour of trading, and increase again in the last hour.
18 For added robustness, we perform a similar analysis on the median depths and spreads. The results are
qualitatively similar but not reported.
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Fig. 2c, f show the intraday mean depths and spreads for cold IPOs. The bid depth is
higher at the start of trading, and then stabilizes over time in the pre- and post-decimal-
ization periods. However, the ask depth is stable throughout the whole day in both periods.
The bid depth at the beginning of trading in the post-decimalization period is higher than
that in the pre-decimalization period, while the ask depth in the post-decimalization period
is considerably smaller over time compared to the pre-decimalization period. The relative
quoted and effective spreads are unchanged over time, but only slightly higher initially in
both periods.
Fig. 2 This figure shows the intraday patterns of bid depth, ask depth, quoted spread, and effective spread
for 230 NYSE-listed IPOs before and after decimalization. The mean values are based on 30-min intervals
from 9:30 A.M. to 4:00 P.M. Bid, ask depth are in terms of round lots. We compute the intraday time
weighted quoted spread as a proportion of share price, [(Ai,t - Bi,t)/Mi,t]. Effective spread is defined as a
proportion of share price, [2Di,t(Pi,t - Mi,t)/Mi,t]. Results for hot, warm, and cold IPOs are presented in a–
f, where hot IPOs are those that open above the offering price by more than 10 %, warm IPOs open above
the offering price by no more than 10 %, and cold IPOs open at or below offering price. a Intraday bid and
ask depth for Hot IPOs, b intraday bid and ask depth for warm IPOs, c intraday bid and ask depth for cold
IPOs, d intraday quoted and effective spreads for hot IPOs, e intraday quoted and effective spreads for warm
IPOs, f intraday quoted and effective spreads for cold IPOs
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4.5 Underwriter price support and short-covering
Underwriter price support is an important source of liquidity for cold IPOs. To provide
price stabilization for cold IPOs in aftermarket trading, the underwriter usually takes an
initial short position in the share offering to manage the price risk induced by stock
flippers. In addition, if the share price declines below the discounted offering price (of-
fering price minus underwriting spread), underwriters will find it profitable to cover their
short position from market purchases.
Boehmer and Fishe (2004b) provide evidence that the short-covering trades tend to be
seller-initiated, and is positively related to the fraction of trades at the bid. These results
indicate that the underwriter is willing to provide liquidity when more sellers are in the
market, e.g., in a cold IPO market. Following Boehmer and Fishe (2004b)’s argument, we
plot the frequency (size) of trades at the bid price relative to the offering price of cold
IPOs19 in the pre- and post-decimalization periods to examine the underwriter short-
covering price support that provides liquidity20 in aftermarket trading.
Corwin et al. (2004) document that the underwriter provides price support for cold IPOs
through the trading floor to the quoted bid depth. Boehmer and Fishe (2004b) find that
81 % of the short-covering volume originates from the trading floor, and 79 % of trades at
the bid results from short-covering trades. Thus, we expect that the limit buy order exe-
cution is higher when underwriter short-covering is likely. To identify the limit orders, we
employ the algorithm proposed by Greene (1997). The inferred limit order algorithm looks
at the difference between two successive quotes. If the ask and bid prices remain the same
but the depth of the bid decreases, the algorithm looks for a trade or trades that took place
at the bid price after the first quote but before the second quote. It then classifies the portion
of trades equaling to the difference in depths as having been executed against limit buy
orders. If the bid price of the second quote is lower than that of the first, then the portion of
the intervening trades which were executed at the original bid price is said to have been
executed against limit buy orders. A similar classification is applied to the ask side to
identify the execution of limit sell orders. We then plot the number of shares of limit buy
orders executed at bid quotes relative to the offering price of cold IPOs to assess the
possibility of short-covering trades.
In the post-decimalization period, where the tick size is just one cent, the underwriter
may face increased selling pressure from stock flippers of cold issues and the smaller
reward from providing liquidity. Thus, if we observe that the underwriter continues to
provide price stabilization for cold IPOs by short-covering in the aftermarket, decimal
pricing should not then have a significant effect on their short-covering strategy. Figure 3a,
b present the frequency of trades at the bid relative to the offering price of cold IPOs in the
pre- and post-decimalization periods, respectively. There is a high frequency of trades at
the offering price both pre- and post-decimalization. This result is consistent with the
finding that the underwriter provides price support at the offering price for cold IPOs (see
Ruud (1993) and Hanley et al. (1993)). In Fig. 3a, we observe some clustering of trades
around -$0.25 to -$0.50 relative to the offering price in the pre-decimalization period.
Similarly, in Fig. 3b, the trades clearly cluster around -$0.30 to -$0.50 which is 50 ticks
19 Underwriters usually provide price support for cold IPOs by short-covering in aftermarket trading (see
Aggarwal (2000) and Boehmer and Fishe (2004a, b).
20 Boehmer and Fishe (2004b) document that the underwriter generally submits passive buy orders to
provide liquidity.
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below the offering price in the post-decimalization period. This result is fully consistent
with the short-covering strategy of the underwriter.
Figure 3c, d plot the volume of trades at the bid relative to the offer price of cold IPOs
in the pre- and post-decimalization periods, respectively. The patterns are consistent with
Figure 3a, b in that the short-covering volume is larger at the offering price and between
-$0.25 and -$0.50 relative to the offering price both pre- and post-decimalization.
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Fig. 3 Frequency of trades at bid prices, trading volume at bid prices, and limit buy order execution at bid
prices in pre- and post-decimalization for cold IPOs. The figures plot the number of trades, total volume, and
limit buy order execution at bids relative to the offering prices of cold IPOs in pre- and post-decimalization.
Limit buy order is identified using Greene (1997)’s methodology. IPOs issued after January 29, 2001 are
classified in the post-decimalization period. a Number of trades at bid prices—pre-decimalization, b number
of trades at bid prices—post-decimalization, c trading volume at bid prices—pre-decimalization, d trading
volume at bid prices—post-decimalization, e limit buy order execution—pre-decimalization, f limit buy
order execution—post-decimalization
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Figure 3e, f show the limit buy order volumes executed at bid quotes relative to the
offering prices of cold IPOs both pre- and post-decimalization, respectively. We observe
that there is a higher frequency of execution of limit buy orders at the IPO offering price
and also when the share price drops substantially below the offering price both pre- and
post-decimalization. This interesting result suggests that underwriters are still the only
liquidity provider supporting cold IPOs, and who cover their short positions with after-
market purchases when it is still profitable to do so post-decimalization.
In Table 5, we test for underwriter short-covering for cold IPOs both pre- and post-
decimalization. Following Boehmer and Fishe (2004b), we compute the proportion of
Table 5 Test for underwriter short-covering before and after decimalization
Relative price (RP)
cumulative interval
Pre-decimalization Post-decimalization Difference (Post – Pre)
Mean
[% to all
bids B 0]
Median
[% to all
bids B 0]
Mean
[% to all
bids B 0]
Median
[% to all
bids B 0]
Mean
(t-statistic)
Median
(z-statistic)
Panel A: Proportion of cumulative number of trades at bids
RP = 0 0.521
[73 %]
0.422
[43 %]
0.229
[37 %]
0.145
[15 %]
-0.292***
(3.14)
-0.277**
(-2.13)
-0.0625 B RP B 0 0.531
[74 %]
0.422
[43 %]
0.264
[43 %]
0.148
[15 %]
-0.267***
(2.86)
-0.274**
(-2.13)
-0.13 B RP B 0 0.489
[68 %]
0.423
[43 %]
0.272
[44 %]
0.212
[22 %]
-0.217**
(2.40)
-0.211
(-1.45)
-0.25 B RP B 0 0.526
[73 %]
0.445
[45 %]
0.301
[49 %]
0.160
[16 %]
-0.225**
(2.52)
-0.285*
(-1.92)
-0.50 B RP B 0 0.616
[86 %]
0.770
[78 %]
0.477
[78 %]
0.397
[41 %]
-0.139
(1.37)
-0.373*
(-1.68)
RP B 0 0.71done7
[100 %]
0.981
[100 %]
0.612
[100 %]
0.974
[100 %]
-0.105
(1.03)
-0.007
(-0.98)
Panel B: Proportion of cumulative trading volume at bids
RP = 0 0.700
[83 %]
0.834
[98 %]
0.477
[64 %]
0.475
[51 %]
-0.223***
(2.68)
-0.359***
(-2.71)
-0.0625 B RP B 0 0.703
[83 %]
0.835
[98 %]
0.497
[66 %]
0.475
[51 %]
-0.206**
(2.51)
-0.360***
(-2.59)
-0.13 B RP\ 0 0.641
[76 %]
0.747
[88 %]
0.506
[68 %]
0.475
[51 %]
-0.135
(1.61)
-0.272*
(-1.70)
-0.25 B RP B 0 0.704
[83 %]
0.811
[96 %]
0.492
[66 %]
0.467
[50 %]
-0.212**
(2.64)
-0.344***
(-2.78)
-0.50 B RP B 0 0.766
[90 %]
0.868
[100 %]
0.634
[85 %]
0.671
[72 %]
-0.132
(1.66)
-0.197**
(-2.01)
RP B 0 0.847
[100 %]
0.848
[100 %]
0.749
[100 %]
0.926
[100 %]
-0.098
(1.40)
0.078
(1.04)
This table tests for the underwriter short-covering for cold IPOs in pre- and post-decimalization. The relative
price (RP) is the difference between trade price and offering price. The RP is grouped into six cumulative
intervals. We compute the proportion of number of trades at bids as the number of trades at the bid prices
relative to the total number of trades at bids. The proportion of trading volume at bids is defined as the
trading volume at bids as proportion to total trading volume at bids. In the square parentheses, we report the
percentage of the number of trades (trading volume) at bids in the respective intervals relative to the total
number of trades (trading volume) occurred at and below the offering price. The t-statistics for mean and
z-statistics based on Wilcoxon signed ranks test for median are presented in the parentheses
*,**,*** The independent sample test for the difference between means or medians in pre- and post-
decimalization, and represent the 10, 5, and 1 % two-tailed significance level, respectively
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trades at the bid price relative to the total number of trades and group them into six
incremental intervals based on the relative price between the IPO trade and offering prices.
Consistent with Fig. 3, the results show that the proportion of cumulative number of trades
(trading volume) at the bid price is higher at the offering price and at farther below the
offering price in both pre- and post-decimalization. We also compute the percentage of
trades in each cumulative interval occurring at and below the offering price. More than
37–83 % of trades occur at and below the offering price as a proportion of the total number
of trades at the bid price. Further, we find that the proportion of the cumulative number of
trades at the bid is not significantly different between the pre- and post-decimalization
periods for relative prices (RP) farther below the offering price, i.e., RP B -$0.50, sug-
gesting that underwriter short-covering behavior by market purchase does not change after
decimalization if short-covering is still profitable farther below the offering price.
In sum, regardless of decimal pricing or a smaller tick size, our findings suggest that the
underwriter is still the only liquidity provider for cold IPOs, which covers their short
position from market purchases and earns an attractive profit from covering farther below
the offering price, i.e., $0.25 to $0.50 below the offering price. This implies that the
decimalization does not affect the trading strategy of the underwriter in the aftermarket
trading for cold IPOs.
4.6 Flipping activity
Previous studies document that institutions flip more often than retail investors. To assess
flipping activity in the IPO aftermarket trading, we use the algorithm of Krigman et al.
(1999) by classifying seller-initiated trades of[10,000 shares as institutional flipping. Lee
and Ready’s (1991) algorithm is used to sign all transactions. The flipping ratio is com-
puted as the first-day sell-signed block-trade dollar volume to the total dollar volume
traded on the first day.
In addition to the flipping algorithm of Krigman et al. (1999), we also adopt two more
proxies for institutional trading. First, we employ the inferred institutional trading algo-
rithm of Campbell et al. (2009) to classify transactions under $2000 or over $30,000 in size
as institutional trading.21 Second, we use the cut-off institutional trading algorithm of Lee
and Radhakrishna (2000) to classify all trades over $20,000 as institutional. We compute
these two flipping ratios as the first-day sell-initiated institutional-trade volume to total
volume traded.
Panels A of Table 6 shows that institutions generally flip more cold than hot IPOs in
both the pre- and post-decimalization periods as investors have the incentive to sell off and
get out of cold IPOs to avoid further price deterioration. In Panel A1 of the table, insti-
tutions flip on average 47 and 40 % of total dollar volume of cold IPOs in the pre- and
post-decimalization periods, respectively, whereas institutions flip\30 % of hot IPOs both
pre- and post-decimalization.22 However, from Panels A1, A2, and A3 of Table 6, the
results suggest that decimal pricing does not change the flipping strategy of institutions for
cold IPOs as theirs is most likely bound by underwriter price support and the initial shares
21 Campbell et al. (2004) note that institutions might break trades into extremely small sizes when they are
stealth trading, or institutions are likely to engage in scrum trades to round off an extremely small equity
position, and institutions may put in tiny iceberg trades to test the waters before trading in a larger size.
Aggarwal (2003) documents that institutions split their orders into smaller sizes in order to reduce the price
impact.
22 Krigman et al. (1999) find that institutional flipping accounts for 45 and 22 % of the total dollar volume
of cold and hot IPOs, respectively.
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Table 6 Flipping Activities of IPOs Aftermarket Trading
Pre-decimalization Post-decimalization
Hot Warm Cold All Hot Warm Cold All
(52) (33) (29) (114) (58) (40) (28) (116)
Panel A: Flipping Activities of IPOs
Panel A1: Krigman et al. (1999)’s algorithm
Institution Flipping (%)
Mean 23.15 29.23 40.64 29.21 27.83** 31.71 37.89 31.54
Median 20.36 27.42 35.41 24.39 27.50*** 30.87 36.55 29.56***
Non-institution Flipping (%)
Mean 13.33 12.46 15.30 13.58 16.02** 14.34 14.45 15.06
Median 12.48 12.09 11.72 12.15 16.02** 14.69 11.97 14.94*
Panel A2: Campbell et al. (2009)’s algorithm
Institution Flipping (%)
Mean 32.98 38.16 49.36 38.60 39.53*** 41.95 45.60 41.83*
Median 29.46 35.40 45.84 32.94 38.60*** 41.18** 44.09 40.04***
Non-institution Flipping (%)
Mean 3.62 3.66 5.29 4.05 4.39 4.16 5.48 4.57
Median 3.19 3.24 3.53 3.28 4.08** 3.44 3.55 3.67*
Panel A3: Lee and Radhakrishna (2000)’s algorithm
Institution Flipping (%)
Mean 34.00 39.11 50.75 39.69 41.08*** 43.17 48.06 43.45*
Median 30.52 36.55 48.03 33.55 40.46*** 42.01** 47.35 41.40***
Non-institution Flipping (%)
Mean 2.59 2.71 3.90 2.95 2.84 2.93 4.73 3.33
Median 2.40 2.22 2.25 2.25 2.69 2.13 2.71 2.38
Hot Warm Cold
Panel B: Regression analysis of institution flipping activities of hot, warm and cold IPOs
Intercept 0.1117
(0.60)
-0.0462
(-0.11)
-0.5263
(-1.38)
Post 0.0740
(3.29)***
0.0131
(0.37)
0.0017
(0.03)
Underpricing -0.0006
(-0.96)
-0.0170
(-2.56)**
0.0552
(3.78)***
Log (price) 0.0173
(0.63)
0.1082
(2.16)**
0.2448
(3.12)***
Log (volume) 0.0115
(0.54)
0.0286
(0.70)
0.0251
(0.54)
Log (range) -0.0243
(-1.08)
0.0136
(0.40)
-0.0499
(-1.68)*
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allocated to them.23 We also find that institutions tend to flip more hot IPOs post-deci-
malization (significant at 1 % level), indicating that the cost of flipping hot IPOs is lower
than in the pre-decimalization period given that the share prices of hot IPOs rise sub-
stantially. The results are consistent overall for all three institutional flipping proxies.
The regression results in Panel B of Table 6 reaffirm our univariate findings that
institutional investors tend to flip more hot IPOs post-decimalization. The coefficient of
Post is positive and statistically significant at the 1 % level for hot IPOs, but it is not
significant for warm and cold IPOs. The coefficient of Underpricing for cold IPOs is
positive and statistically significant at the 1 % level, supporting our argument that insti-
tutions flip cold IPOs immediately at the offering price where the underwriter provides
strong price support. This result is particularly noteworthy.
In Table 7, we further divide each trading day into five time intervals: 09:30–10:00,
10:00–11:30, 11:30–14:00, 14:00–15:30, and 15:30–16:00. In Panels A, B, and C of
Table 7, institutional flipping for hot IPOs post-decimalization is largely higher than the
pre-decimalization period throughout the first day. Particularly, the observation of higher
institutional flipping of hot IPOs post-decimalization is mostly captured during the first 2 h
of trading (significant at the 5 % level). This result is consistent with the notion that sellers
in the opening trade are likely to be investors who obtained shares in the original offer.
Table 6 continued
Hot Warm Cold
F-statistic 2.58** 1.95* 3.60***
Adj. R2 0.088 0.079 0.224
This table presents the flipping ratio for hot, warm, and cold IPOs pre- and post-decimalization. In Panel A1,
using the Krigman et al. (1999) algorithm, we compute the flipping ratio as the first-day sell-signed block-
trade dollar volume to total dollar volume traded on the first-day. The Block-trade is defined as transactions
of 10,000 shares or more. Non-institution flipping is defined as sell-signed trades of smaller than 10,000
shares. In Panel A2, employing the Campbell et al. (2009) algorithm of institutional trading, we compute the
flipping ratio as the first-day sell-initiated institutional-trade volume to total volume trade. Institutional-trade
is defined as transactions under $2000 or over $30,000 in size. In Panel A3, we use the Lee and Rad-
hakrishna (2000) algorithm to classify all trades over $20,000 as institutions. Lee and Ready (1991)
algorithm is used to sign all transaction. For the comparison of the pre- and post-decimalization means and
medians, we compute the t-statistics and the z-statistics based on Wilcoxon signed ranks test. *, **, and ***
represent the 10, 5, and 1 % two-tailed significance level, respectively. In Panel B, we perform the
regression analysis for the institution flipping (Flip_Inst) for hot, warm, and cold IPOs. Price is the average
trade price. Volume is the trading volume. Range is the difference between the high and low trade prices
divided by the midpoint of the bid–ask prices. Underpricing is the offer-to-open returns defined as (opening
price - offering price)/offering price * 100. Post is a binary variable indicating the decimal era (January 29,
2001–December, 31, 2004)
23 To investigate the selling pressure of cold IPOs post-decimalization, we collect the overallotment options
(green shoe options) data for cold IPOs from the SDC database, and find that overallotment shares increase
in price post-decimalization but the results are not statistically significant. However, the overallotment
shares remain relatively the same for both hot and warm IPOs, pre- and post-decimalization. The results are
not reported but available upon request. Ellis et al. (2000, 2002) document that the quality of overallotment
exercise data provided by the SDC is a concern. Thus, we are unable to examine whether the overallotment
options are exercised more for hot, warm or cold IPOs. However, in general, underwriters receive about
22 % (20 %) of green shoe options for hot (cold) IPOs in both the pre- and post-decimalization periods. We
thank the referee for pointing out this issue.
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Table 7 Intraday Pattern of Institutional Flipping
Intraday interval Pre-decimalization Post-decimalization
Hot Warm Cold All Hot Warm Cold All
(52) (33) (29) (114) (58) (40) (28) (116)
Panel A: Krigman et al. (1999)’s algorithm
09:30–10:00 Mean 14.85 22.75 39.04 26.13 21.84 21.04 47.50 28.33
Median 8.81 12.19 27.14 12.76 17.43** 16.70 38.88 21.20**
10:00–11:30 Mean 26.39 33.42 43.02 32.18 32.49** 35.75 36.99 34.63
Median 20.58 32.87 36.53 27.90 31.40*** 31.08 33.84 31.67*
11:30–14:00 Mean 28.79 39.47 39.36 34.30 25.68 34.06 29.11* 29.32**
Median 29.42 38.48 33.30 32.50 25.70 35.19 23.84* 27.88*
14:00–15:30 Mean 25.88 37.23 47.78 34.77 25.62 31.75 26.19*** 27.93***
Median 24.70 37.18 44.77 29.68 25.74 30.23 19.93*** 27.48**
15:30–16:00 Mean 34.13 41.97 46.24 39.40 29.53 40.69 35.43* 34.76
Median 28.67 38.72 50.64 35.72 24.49 40.57 34.70* 31.88
Panel B: Campbell et al. (2009)’s algorithm
09:30–10:00 Mean 17.15 25.70 43.49 29.12 25.27 25.16 50.14 31.88
Median 11.07 14.71 33.36 18.15 21.35** 21.75 46.86 25.43*
10:00–11:30 Mean 36.63 45.42 58.08 44.07 44.51** 47.96 47.33 46.34
Median 30.31 47.07 53.91 44.56 43.21*** 46.80 42.93* 45.44
11:30–14:00 Mean 46.89 54.02 52.75 50.40 42.32* 46.36** 41.63* 43.55***
Median 49.77 51.54 48.35 50.36 41.13* 48.04* 36.29* 43.00***
14:00–15:30 Mean 42.65 51.90 65.90 51.04 41.35 45.00 41.16*** 42.57***
Median 40.06 53.25 66.74 47.36 43.92 41.63* 39.92*** 41.99***
15:30–16:00 Mean 50.59 56.18 62.87 55.22 46.75 56.28 44.70** 49.54*
Median 53.55 55.86 61.22 55.13 48.87 61.53 40.65** 49.32*
Panel C: Lee and Radhakrishna (2000)’s algorithm
09:30–10:00 Mean 16.12 26.27 44.32 28.93 25.72 26.02 52.66 32.73
Median 10.33 14.72 34.81 18.73 21.38*** 22.61 47.43 26.64**
10:00–11:30 Mean 37.71 46.77 60.56 45.55 45.98** 49.49 48.81* 47.83
Median 32.08 50.26 55.33 47.28 45.70** 50.89 44.69* 47.14
11:30–14:00 Mean 49.01 56.17 54.90 52.53 44.71 48.27** 44.47* 45.89***
Median 52.17 55.13 51.76 52.45 44.52 48.68* 38.65 45.16***
14:00–15:30 Mean 45.06 53.46 68.99 53.37 44.39 47.16 43.64*** 45.18***
Median 41.73 54.85 70.44 49.54 45.95 44.30 39.71*** 45.91***
15:30–16:00 Mean 53.77 58.22 66.28 58.17 49.28 58.45 48.39** 52.26**
Median 54.55 56.21 67.27 58.31 51.57 62.21 43.98*** 52.98*
This table plots the intraday means and medians of the institutional flipping. The mean and median values
are based on Five intraday intervals from 9:30 A.M. to 4:00 P.M. Hot IPOs are those that open above the
offering price by more than 10 %, warm IPOs open above the offering price by no more than 10 %, and cold
IPOs open at or below offering price. We test the means and medians between pre- and post-decimalization
by t test and Wilcoxon signed ranks test, respectively
*,** The 10 and 5 % two-tailed significance level, respectively
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However, we do not observe the same pattern for warm and cold IPOs in the post-
decimalization period.
Since trading volume of cold IPOs is relatively lower than hot IPOs in aftermarket
trading (Aggarwal (2003)),24 for robustness, we compute a flipping ratio as the first-day
sell-signed block-trade to the total number of shares offered for each of the three insti-
tutional trading proxies. The results (not reported but available upon request) show that
institutional flipping based on shares offered for hot IPOs is still higher and significant at
the 5 % level in the post-decimalization period. However, institutional flipping of cold
IPOs is not different between the pre- and post-decimalization periods.25 Therefore, our
overall results suggest that institutions flip more hot IPOs in the post-decimalization
period.
4.7 Regression analysis
In this section, we present a cross-sectional regression analysis to examine whether dec-
imalization affects spread and depth on the first day of an IPO’s aftermarket trading. The
dependent variables are time-weighted quoted dollar spread, trade-weighted effective
dollar spread, and the bid and ask depth. The independent variables include: (1) a dummy
variable for the post-decimalization period, which equals to 1 if an IPO is issued after
decimalization, and zero otherwise; (2) underpricing, measured for hot, warm, and cold
IPOs, which is computed based on the offer-to-open returns of IPOs; (3) natural logarithm
of average intraday prices; (4) natural logarithm of average trading volume; (5) natural
logarithm of the range defined as the difference between the highest and lowest trade price
divided by the average midpoint of the bid–ask price in a trading day; (6) natural logarithm
of the number of lead and co-lead managers in each IPO; and (7) underwriter market shares
defined for each lead underwriter as a proportion of the IPO proceeds raised during the
sample period.
The regression results are presented in Panel A of Table 8. The spreads and depths are
significantly lower at the 5 % level post-decimalization. There is a positive relation
between spreads and underpricing, but no significant relation between depth and under-
pricing. The interaction term between the post-decimalization dummy variable and
underpricing is negative and significantly related to spreads.26 This result suggests that the
greater the underpricing, the lower will be the spreads post-decimalization. This interaction
relationship, however, does not hold for depth, suggesting that decimal pricing has the
same effect on depth for hot, warm, and cold IPOs. The number of lead and co-lead
managers, which proxies for the manager’s market-making ability in IPOs by providing
liquidity, and the underwriter’s market share, which proxies for reputation, are only pos-
itive and significant at the 5 % level for the bid depth. The results indicate that larger-sized
24 The mean and median of the first day total trading volume for hot (cold) IPOs are 12.64 (9.65) and 8.60
(7.18) million, respectively, in our sample.
25 The mean values of shares traded as a proportion of total shares offered on the first trading day are 62.07
and 64.77 % in the pre- and post-decimalization periods, respectively. Aggarwal (2003) reports that the
mean of the shares traded as a proportion of total shares offered in the first two days is 81.97 %. Thus, we
eliminate outliers which are defined as shares traded on the first day that are more than 100 % of the total
shares offered. 5 (8 %) and 4 (7 %) IPOs are deleted in pre- and post-decimalization, respectively, from the
sample.
26 To control for the possible effect from the quoting environment (e.g., different tick size) on the
underpricing, we adjust the underpricing by regressing the underpricing variable on the a variable of
decimalization for hot, warm, and cold IPOs. The results remain unchanged for all models.
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managers and underwriters with a higher reputation are associated with a higher bid depth
of IPOs in aftermarket trading. Price, volume, and range are used as control variables in
our regression models, the results of which are consistent with previous findings [e.g.,
Harris (1994)]. The adjusted R2 in all the models are greater than 63 %.
The results in Panel B of Table 8 are also consistent with the subsample regressions for
hot, warm, and cold IPOs. The coefficient of Post is negative and statistically significant
for quoted spreads of both hot IPOs (-0.0728) and cold IPOs (-0.0590). Both bid and ask
depths are found to be smaller for hot, warm, and cold IPOs after decimalization.
5 Sensitivity analysis
5.1 Benchmark
To differentiate the effect of decimalization between IPO and seasoned stocks, we perform
a sensitivity test with a set of control firms27 for our IPO sample. Specifically, we control
for the effect of seasoned stocks by incorporating the effective spreads of the control firms
as an independent variable in the regression model. In Panel A of Table 9, we find that the
quoted and effective spreads of matched hot (cold) IPOs decline more (less) than those of
matched hot (cold) IPOs post-decimalization. In addition, we do not find that the relation
between spreads and underpricing of matched IPOs becomes negative after decimalization
as was the case for IPO firms.
The regression results for the control firms are presented in Panel B of Table 9. In
Model 1–4, we incorporate the effective spreads of the seasoned stocks as one of the
independent variables. The results show that the interaction term, POST 9 Underpricing,
is still negative and significant at the 1 % level in the spread regression. The spread of
control firm (Control) in Model 1–4 of Panel B is not significant. This result strengthens
the finding that, after controlling for the possible decimalization effect on seasoned stocks,
the more underpriced IPOs receive a larger reduction in spreads after decimalization.
Consistent with our earlier findings, bid and ask depths are significantly smaller in the
post-decimalization period after controlling for the matched firms in the regression models.
5.2 NASDAQ-listed IPOs
In this section, we investigate IPOs listed on NASDAQ during 1998–2004. We retrieve the
NASDAQ-listed IPOs from the SDC new issue database. We obtain the final sample of
1189 IPOs. Since decimalization was implemented by NASDAQ on April 9, 2001, there
are 935 and 254 IPOs in the pre- and post-decimalization periods, respectively. The smaller
sample size post-decimalization is due largely to the bursting of the internet bubble in
2001. Based on the offer-to-open returns, we classify the IPOs into 580 hot, 225 warm, and
130 cold issues pre-decimalization, and 95 hot, 125 warm, 34 cold issues post-
decimalization.
In Table 10, we observe that the effective spreads of NASDAQ-listed IPOs decrease
significantly after decimalization for hot and warm IPOs, but the quoted spreads do not
decline for all IPO categories. It is likely that investors have less incentive to reveal their
27 Control firms are selected based on (1) non-IPO firms; (2) NYSE; (3) same 2-digit SIC; and (4) similar
market capitalization, closing price times shares outstanding, prior to IPO listing day to IPO opening price
times shares outstanding. Thus, 230 seasoned stocks are selected as control firms.
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quotes post-decimalization. Since the information content of large sell orders of cold IPOs
is relatively high, the quoted and effective spreads of cold IPOs do not decline much after
decimalization.
Total depth and bid depth are smaller after decimalization for hot and warm IPOs post-
decimalization due to a higher probability of front running. The total depth and bid depth
of cold IPOs do not change much after decimalization because of underwriter price support
and institutional trading. Ask depths are generally smaller after decimalization. The total
number of quotes increases for all IPOs. We find that trading value decreases after deci-
malization, and that trading volume decreases mainly for warm and cold IPOs. The number
of trades decreases significantly for hot and warm IPOs.
In Table 11, the regression results show that the effective spread declines significantly
after decimalization, but the quoted spread surprisingly increases, suggesting that investors
have become less willing to reveal their interests in trading in the post-decimalization
period. The positive relation between underpricing and spreads indicates the different
degrees of information content in the IPOs. Contrary to the results of NYSE-listed IPOs,
we do not find that more underpriced IPOs are associated with a larger reduction in spreads
after decimalization as the interaction term, Post 9 Underpricing, is not significant in the
regression models.
Decimalization has a negative impact on bid and ask depths. The negative and sig-
nificant Underpricing coefficient suggests that the more underpriced IPOs are, the smaller
would be the bid and ask depths. Interestingly, the negative and significant relation
between the bid (ask) depth and the interaction term suggests that the bid (ask) depth of the
more underpriced IPOs decreases more than that of less underpriced IPOs post-decimal-
ization. This finding provides evidence for underwriter price support and high selling
pressure of cold IPOs. The smaller depth of hot IPOs may be due to the increased adverse
selection cost and higher probability of front running.
5.3 OpenBook introduction
The OpenBook was introduced in January 2002, which overlapped with our sample period
of 1998–2004. Boehmer et al. (2005) find that the introduction of OpenBook improves
market quality. To examine whether our results are driven by the OpenBook introduction,
we stratify our sample into pre-OpenBook (January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2001), and
post-decimalization (January 29, 2001 to December 31, 2004) periods, denoting the two
sub-samples by a dummy variable. Our univariate and regression results (not reported but
available upon request) show that the spreads of hot IPOs decline significantly more than
that of cold IPOs in the post-decimalization period prior to the introduction of OpenBook.
To examine whether the introduction of OpenBook has a similar impact on the spreads
of NYSE-listed IPOs, we split our data into pre- and post-OpenBook sub-samples in the
post-decimalization period from January 29, 2001 to December 31, 2004. Our results (not
reported) show that there is no relation between the spreads and underpricing of NYSE-
listed IPOs post-decimalization in the presence of OpenBook introduction. Overall, our
results for the spreads of hot, warm, and cold IPOs in the post-decimalization period are
robust and rigorous regardless of the introduction of OpenBook in January 2002.
1340 C. Charoenwong et al.
123
T
a
b
le
1
1
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
an
al
y
si
s
fo
r
N
A
S
D
A
Q
-l
is
te
d
IP
O
s
Q
S
p
re
ad
E
S
p
re
ad
B
id
D
ep
th
A
sk
D
ep
th
M
o
d
el
1
M
o
d
el
2
M
o
d
el
1
M
o
d
el
2
M
o
d
el
1
M
o
d
el
2
M
o
d
el
1
M
o
d
el
2
In
te
rc
ep
t
0
.0
2
0
4
0
.0
2
0
4
0
.0
2
2
7
0
.0
2
2
8
0
.9
2
2
9
0
.8
4
7
5
1
.2
9
3
7
1
.2
5
8
1
(7
.4
3
)*
*
*
(7
.4
4
)*
*
*
(1
0
.2
7
)*
*
*
(1
0
.3
0
)*
*
*
(2
.4
7
)*
*
(2
.2
9
)*
*
(4
.4
6
)*
*
*
(4
.3
5
)*
*
*
P
o
st
0
.0
0
2
3
0
.0
0
2
2
-
0
.0
0
1
6
-
0
.0
0
1
8
-
0
.3
9
9
3
-
0
.2
3
2
3
-
0
.4
4
6
9
-
0
.3
6
8
3
(5
.9
9
)*
*
*
(4
.7
2
)*
*
*
(-
5
.2
9
)*
*
*
(-
5
.0
1
)*
*
*
(-
7
.7
1
)*
*
*
(-
3
.7
7
)*
*
*
(-
1
1
.1
2
)*
*
*
(-
7
.6
6
)*
*
*
U
n
d
er
p
ri
ci
n
g
0
.0
0
2
0
0
.0
0
2
0
0
.0
0
2
4
0
.0
0
2
4
-
0
.1
1
8
8
-
0
.1
3
4
4
-
0
.1
0
3
1
-
0
.1
1
0
5
(7
.0
5
)*
*
*
(7
.0
6
)*
*
*
(1
0
.4
0
)*
*
*
(1
0
.4
5
)*
*
*
(-
3
.0
3
)*
*
*
(-
3
.4
8
)*
*
*
(-
3
.4
3
)*
*
*
(-
3
.6
7
)*
*
*
L
o
g
(p
ri
ce
)
-
0
.0
0
6
3
-
0
.0
0
6
4
-
0
.0
0
5
7
-
0
.0
0
5
8
-
0
.0
5
7
1
-
0
.0
1
9
3
-
0
.1
1
5
4
-
0
.0
9
7
6
(-
1
7
.1
9
)*
*
*
(-
1
7
.0
6
)*
*
*
(-
1
9
.3
4
)*
*
*
(-
1
9
.2
8
)*
*
*
(-
1
.1
3
)
(-
0
.3
8
)
(-
2
.9
6
)*
*
*
(-
2
.4
8
)*
*
L
o
g
(v
o
lu
m
e)
0
.0
0
0
4
0
.0
0
0
4
-
0
.0
0
0
0
4
-
0
.0
0
0
0
3
0
.2
7
8
5
0
.2
7
4
9
0
.2
2
9
8
0
.2
2
8
1
(1
.2
5
)
(1
.2
6
)
(-
0
.1
5
)
(-
0
.1
3
)
(6
.7
0
)*
*
*
(6
.6
7
)*
*
*
(7
.1
2
)*
*
*
(7
.0
9
)*
*
*
L
o
g
(r
an
g
e)
0
.0
0
5
0
0
.0
0
5
0
0
.0
0
8
2
0
.0
0
8
2
-
0
.2
3
9
7
-
0
.2
5
4
1
-
0
.2
5
6
1
-
0
.2
6
2
9
(3
.8
9
)*
*
*
(3
.9
0
)*
*
*
(7
.9
0
)*
*
*
(7
.9
2
)*
*
*
(-
1
.3
7
)
(-
1
.4
7
)
(-
1
.8
9
)*
(-
1
.9
5
)*
P
o
st
9
u
n
d
er
p
ri
ci
n
g
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
2
2
-
1
.6
8
0
4
-
0
.7
9
1
6
(0
.4
8
)
(1
.0
9
)
(-
4
.9
0
)*
*
*
(-
2
.9
6
)*
*
*
F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
1
0
5
.7
7
*
*
*
8
8
.1
3
*
*
*
1
0
0
.6
4
*
*
*
8
4
.0
8
*
*
*
5
6
.6
9
*
*
*
5
2
.1
6
*
*
*
9
2
.6
8
*
*
*
7
9
.2
0
*
*
*
A
d
j.
R
2
0
.3
0
6
0
.3
0
6
0
.2
9
6
0
.2
9
6
0
.1
9
0
0
.2
0
5
0
.2
7
8
0
.2
8
3
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
s,
Q
S
p
re
a
d
,
E
S
p
re
a
d
,
an
d
B
id
(A
sk
)
D
ep
th
d
en
o
te
th
e
ti
m
e-
w
ei
g
h
te
d
q
u
o
te
d
d
o
ll
ar
sp
re
ad
,
tr
ad
e-
w
ei
g
h
te
d
ef
fe
ct
iv
e
d
o
ll
ar
sp
re
ad
,
an
d
th
e
to
ta
l
b
id
(a
sk
)
q
u
o
te
d
sh
ar
e
d
ep
th
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
.
P
ri
ce
is
th
e
av
er
ag
e
tr
ad
e
p
ri
ce
.
V
o
lu
m
e
is
av
er
ag
e
th
e
tr
ad
in
g
v
o
lu
m
e.
R
an
g
e
is
th
e
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
h
ig
h
an
d
lo
w
tr
ad
e
p
ri
ce
s
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
th
e
m
id
p
o
in
t
o
f
th
e
b
id
–
as
k
p
ri
ce
s.
U
n
d
er
p
ri
ci
n
g
is
th
e
o
ff
er
-t
o
-o
p
en
re
tu
rn
s
d
efi
n
ed
as
(o
p
en
in
g
p
ri
ce
-
o
ff
er
in
g
p
ri
ce
)/
o
ff
er
in
g
p
ri
ce
*
1
0
0
.
P
o
st
is
a
b
in
ar
y
v
ar
ia
b
le
in
d
ic
at
in
g
th
e
d
ec
im
al
er
a
(A
p
ri
al
9
,
2
0
0
1
–
D
ec
em
b
er
,
3
1
,
2
0
0
4
).
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
sh
o
w
n
in
th
e
p
ar
en
th
es
es
*
*
,*
*
*
T
h
e
5
,
an
d
1
%
tw
o
-t
ai
le
d
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
Decimalization, IPO aftermath, and liquidity 1341
123
6 Summary and conclusion
While numerous studies document the effect of decimalization on various aspects of themarket
quality of seasoned stocks, none has explored how decimalization may affect the information
contained in newly listed securities and how it may benefit investors in the IPO aftermarket. In
this study, we investigate the various effects of decimalization on the aftermarket trading of
NYSE-listed IPOs. We find that, after decimalization, the relation between spreads and
underpricing becomes negative. Hot IPOs receive a greater reduction in spreads than cold IPOs
due to an increase of price competition resulting from the smaller tick size. Depths are also
smaller post-decimalization, especially the ask depth. This low displayed liquidity is due to the
increased probability of front running post-decimalization, which aggravates the cost of
adverse selection at the start of IPO trading, and that of submitting limit orders.
Consistent with the underwriter price support for cold IPOs hypothesis, we find more
trades cluster at and farther below the offering price in both the pre- and post-decimal-
ization periods. This result indicates that the underwriter continues to provide liquidity and
price support for cold IPOs at the offering price, and is only willing to cover their short
position when it is still profitable to do so regardless of the smaller tick size that may
increase their short-covering cost.
Previous research finds that institutions flip more than retail investors in aftermarket
trading of IPOs. Using Krigman et al. (1999)’s algorithm and different measures of
institutional trading, we find that decimalization does not alter the flipping strategy of
institutions for cold IPOs. Given that cold IPOs are more likely to be flipped, it is possible
that flipping activity in the aftermarket is bound by both underwriter price support and the
initial shares allocated to institutions. However, we find that institutions tend to flip more
hot IPOs post-decimalization than in the pre-decimalization period. This is due to the
lowered cost of flipping as stock prices of hot IPOs usually increase substantially in
aftermarket trading. Because data on short-covering and flipping are not publicly available,
the analyses in this study are limited to the available data. However, our results provide a
better understanding of the effects of decimalization on the aftermarket trading of IPOs.
We investigate the implications of our findings to recent IPOs and find that, today,
investors are able to trade IPOs at a lower cost in their aftermarket trading. Specifically, the
cost of trading hot IPOs has come down significantly over the pre- to post-decimalization
periods, implying that investors who want to trade IPOs can now buy or sell stocks at a
lower transaction cost in the aftermarket, thereby maximizing their profits. For robustness,
we examine IPOs in 2013 (N = 53) and find that spreads of all IPOs (hot, warm or cold)
have remained significantly lower than during the pre-decimalization period, with hot IPOs
having the largest reduction. In fact, the new findings (not shown but available upon
request) are not significantly different from those in the immediate post-decimalization
period in 2001. Thus, our conclusions have remained consistent over time. Regulatory
authorities considering sub-decimal pricing would benefit from examining its likely impact
on the financial market as documented in this study.
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